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What Do We Know About
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An Evaluative Survey
Richard J. sexton andJulieIskow
A debate has arisen concerning the economic efficiency of cooperatives relative
to other organizational forms. This paper discusses the efficiency concepts and
economic theory relevant to the debate and then proceeds to study the empirical
evidence. No credible evidence exists to support the proposition that cooperatives
are inefficient relative to investor-owned businesses.
Public policy toward agriculturalcooperatives in market-orientedecono-
mies such as the United States andWestern Europe is often favorable. In
the United States public support for cooperatives is considered to include
beneficialtaxtreatment, accessto favorable creditterms, limitedimmunity
from antitrust laws, and free technical assistance. Such policies have,
however. been called into question. An important line ofcriticism is that
cooperatives operate less efficiently than comparable for-profit firms. This
view is Widely held by both farmers and cooperative "experts" as surveys
by Schrader et al. and Cain, Toensmeyer, and Ramsey document. Thus,
itis possiblethatgovernmentsupportofcooperatives fosters an inefficient
organizationform. Forexample. PorterandScullyopineasfollows: "[Plublic
resourcesprovidedtocooperativesfosterandpromoteaninefficientform of
organizingproduction."AndFerrierandPorterconcludethat"agricultural
cooperatives have survived in the U.S.• nurturedbygovernmentsupport."
This paper analyzes the cooperative efficiency issue and evaluates the
conflicting claims that have emerged in this arena. We begin by defining
the economic efficiency concepts that are relevant to the discussion and
then relate these concepts to cooperative theory to derive alternative
hypotheses regardingthe efficiencyofcooperatives. Given this conceptual
basis, studies of cooperative efficiency are reviewed. compared. and cri-
tiqued. The discussion is limited to agricultural marketing and supply
cooperatives in market-oriented economies.
l Our primary conclusion is
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that, despite a numberofrecentstudies addressingcooperative efficiency,
evidenceon the economic efficiency ofcooperatives islimitedand does not
support the popular perception that cooperatives are less efficient than
comparable investor-owned firms.
Economic Efficiency: Concepts and Empirical
Methodology
One problem in comparing and evaluating studies ofcooperatives' effi-
ciency is that many studies do not use formal concepts ofeconomic effi-
ciencyderivedfrom theory. Threedistinctefficiencyconcepts, eachrelevant
tocooperatives, canbederived. Technicalefficiencyreferstoa firm'sability
to generate the maximum output from a given set of inputs. Allocative
efficiency refers to a firm's ability to choose the cost minimizing method
ofproducing a given output. Finally, scale orprice efficiency describes a
firm's ability to choose the "correct" level ofoutput.
To focus theensuingdiscussion, itisusefultoprovideformal definitions
ofeach concept. Let Q denote output, X = {Xl' ... ,Xn} a vector ofinputs,
W = {WI' . . . ,Wn} thecorrespondingvectorofparametricinputprices,and
P the parametricoutput price. In referringto cooperatives, itwill beuseful
todecomposeX as follows: X = {Xl' X_I}' whereXl denotes therawproduct
inputsupplied by members andX-I = {X2 , ••• ,XJ denotes other inputs.
Efficient transformation ofinputs to outputs is characterized by the pro-
duction function Q =jlX), which shows the maximum output attainable
for different combinations of inputs.jlX) is referred to as the production
frontier. Consider a firm that employs the input vector Xo and produces
output level Qo' The firm is technically efficient if:
(1)
and exhibits technical inefficiency otherwise (I.e., Qo <jlXo)'
Allocative efficiency mandates that a given outputlevel, Qo' be produced
at the minimum cost possible. Technical efficiency is necessary but not
sufficient to achieving allocative efficiency. In addition inputs must be
employed so that their ratios of marginal products to input prices are
equated:
(idtX)/aXl)/Wl = (q{(X)/aX2)/W2 = ... = (idtX)/aXn)/Wn (2)
Deviations from equation (2) represent allocative inefficiency. In the case





technicaland allocative efficiency is necessaryfor attaininganyreasonable
cooperative objective. Asimilarconclusiondoes not hold, however, for the
conceptofscaleorpriceefficiency, whichrefers to thefirm's specificchoice
of output level. Two different concepts of the "correct" output level have
been proposed. Most authors (e.g., Atkinson and Halvorsen and Kumbha-
kar, Biswas, and Bailey) have equated scale efficiency with the choice of
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thedual costfunction derived byminimizing WIX1 + . . . + WnXn subject
to.J{X). this concept is manifest in the form of the familiar equating of
price and marginal cost:
P = aC(·)/aQ (3)
Departures from equation (3) represent price or scale inefficiency.
3
To apply this concept to a marketing cooperative, we must assume ini-
tially that the processed product is produced in fixed proportion to the
amountofrawproduct input, Xl. The production function Q = min {AXl,
h(X_l)}embodiesthisproperty. Rawproductcostsareseparablefrom other
processingcosts in thedual cost function associatedwith this production
function:
C(W, Q) = WIQI}. + c(W2, ••• •Wn' Q),
where c(·) denotes the "processing"cost function. P - ac(· )/aQ then repre-
sents the net marginal revenue product (NMRP) of Xl. Equating NMRP
with the members' aggregate marginal cost (MC) function for producing
Xl' yields a cooperative analogue to the price efficiency condition:
NMRP = I,.MCklXlk), 13')
where k = 1,...•m indexes members.
4 Satisfaction of equation (3') is
eqUivalent to a cooperative attaining the value-maximizing solution first
proposedfor a consumerorfarm supplycoop byEnke andfor a marketing
coop by Ohm.
Porter and Scully and Ferrier and Porter employ a different concept of
scale efficiency. A firm is scale efficient in their framework ifand only ifit
produces a level of output that corresponds with the minimum value of
the average cost function. Let AC· denote the minimum value of average
cost defined as:
AC· = min{Q} ClW. Q)/Q.
Scale inefficiency for an output level Qo is measured as the deviation of
the average cost AClQo) of producing Qo using best-practice production
methods from AC•.5
Bothprogrammingand econometric approaches havebeendeveloped to
measureefficiencybasedonequations 11)-13)or13').We provideonlya brief
summary of the approaches. referring interested readers to the original
references for more details. Programming approaches are based on work
by Farrell. Technical efficiency is computed for each observation by first
normalizing each firm's inputand output quantities by its level ofoutput
and then. using linear programming (LP), finding the maximum output
producible for each normalized inputvector. Firms arejudged technically
inefficientifthe maximum output associated with their normalized input
vector exceeds 1.0. Allocative efficiency is found similarly by using LP to
find the cost minimizing input vectorx* for each firm's observed output
level and then computing the ratio W'X*/W'Xo ::s: 1.0, where Ko for each
observation is the observed input vector. Given knowledge of technical
efficiency from the preceding step, deviations in this ratio from its maxi-
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components. This approach is incapable ofmeasuring scale efficiency as
defined in equations (3) or (3'), but Ferrier and Porter show how it may
be used to measure their concept ofscale efficiency.
A popular statistical approach to measuring technical efficiency is the
stochastic production frontier method suggested by Aigner, Lovell, and
Schmidt. Here the production model is specified as Q =jlX)e(E - ...1, where
jlX)eErepresents a stochasticproductionjrontier. and e.... Il. ~ 0, measures
technical efficiency relative to thestochastic frontier for each observation.
Kumbhakar. Biswas. and Baileygeneralize this approach to also measure
allocative and scale efficiency essentially by making equations (2) and (3)
stochasticbehavioralequations throughthe introductionofrandomerror
terms. The realized value of these error terms for each observation mea-
suresdeparturesfrom allocativeandscaleefficiency. Analternativestatisti-
calapproachdevelopedbyAtkinsonandHalvorsen replaces Winequations
(2) and (3) with kW, where the k are parameters to be estimated. The kW
represent shadow prices that reflect actual firm decision making. Devia-
tions ofthe 1c.J from 1.0 measurescale inefficiency (Le., failure to equatean
input'spricewithitsvalueofmarginalproduct), and,similarly, inequalities
amongthe kJ implyviolationofequation(2) and, hence, measureallocative
inefficiency.
The programming approaches and the Kumbhakaretal. approachyield
efficiency estimates for each observation. whereas the Atkinson and Hal-
vorsenapproachyieldsanaverage estimateofefficiencyacross thesample.
However, classical hypothesis tests can be performed upon the 1c.J that
are not possible for the other approaches.
6 A further limitation of the
programming and Kumbhakar et al' approaches is that input prices are
assumed to be constant across observations. TheAtkinsonand Halvorsen
approach is limited as well in that technical effiCiency is a maintained
hypothesis.
Economic Efficiency and Cooperatives
Acornerstone ofneoclassical microeconomic theoryis that marketpres-
sures discipline competitive firms to behave efficiently. When markets
depart fundamentally from the axioms ofcompetition, inefficiencies may
emerge. Firms with market power may exhibit both price and technical
inefficiency. Price inefficiency occurs because price exceeds marginal cost.
buttechnicalinefficiencyresultsfrom excessivecostsduetoa firm's efforts
to maintain or strengthen its monopoly power (Spence) or due to the
absence of competitive pressures in the market (Leibenstein). Technical
inefficiency mayalso existbecauseofthe agency costs associatedwith the
separationofownershipandcontrol, asdiscussedbyJensenandMeckling
andFamaandJensen. Becausedecision makersare oftennotthe residual
claimantsinthemodemfirm, transactionscostsassociatedwithmonitor-
ing managerial performance maybe incurred. Government regulationcan
also distort firms' incentives. so as to induce violations ofequations
(1)_(3).7
The cooperative form oforganizationhasbeenhypothesized tobe ineffi-
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Porter and Scully and Ferrier and Porter argue that cooperatives will be
technically inefficient because principal-agent problems are particularly
acute in cooperatives. Because cooperative stock is nontransferable. no
convenientperformancebarometer.suchasa stockvalue. existsforcooper-
atives. and because ownership is usually diffused among manymembers.
individual membershavelimitedincentivetomonitorperformance. Staatz
(1984) and Caves and Peterson have raised similar concerns.
PorterandScullyand FerrierandPorterfurther argue thatcooperatives
will exhibit allocative inefficiency because of the so-called "horizon prob-
lem." Because members benefit from cooperative investments only over
their horizon as patrons. it is hypothesized that cooperatives will under-
investinlong-livedassetssuchascapitalandpursueinsteadopportunities
designed to generate short-run payoffs.s The horizon problem ordinarily
does not arise in a for-profit corporation because the firm's stock value
reflects the market's expectation ofthe firm's discounted future earnings
stream. Thus owners have correct incentives to balance current profits
with future profit opportunities. Other arguments alleging propensity of
cooperativestounderutilizecapitalfocus onthelackofincentiveincooper-
atives to contribute to thebaseof e~uitycapitalthat. intum. maybeused
to finance capital input purchases.
Finally. Porterand Scully and FerrierandPorterargue thatcooperatives
will often lack sufficient patronage to achieve the cost minimizing scale
of operation and. thus. will exhibit scale ineffiCiency according to their
definition. The suggested reasons are increasing costs of control as the
numberofprincipals (patrons) increasesand legal restrictions on the vol-
ume ofnonmember business conducted.10
Arguments. however. canalso be raisedtosuggestthatcooperativeswill
perform moreefficientlythanfor-profit counterparts. Onesetofarguments
derives from possible cost savings due to internaliZing transactions
through vertical integration. For example. arm's length contracting
through the market may be expensive when one party to the transaction
has assets speCific to the transaction (I.e.. assets thatare sunk). As Klein.
Crawford. and Alchain have noted, this situation creates incentives for
tradingpartners ofthe firm with sunkassets to behave opportunistically.
The potential for opportunistic behavior. in tum. raises costs oftransact-
ing due to contractwriting costs. litigation expenses. and so forth.
To the extent these costs are incurred. they represent departures from
technical efficiency. Given the inputbundle employed, more output could
beachievedifresourcesdevotedtomitigatingopportunismwereredirected
to other uses. Internalizing transactions throughvertical integration cre-
atescommonincentivesatthestageoftransferandeliminatestheproblem.
Cooperatives provide mutual vertical integration for their members. and.
whereas cooperativesdonot internalizetransactionsassuch. theydo har-
monizeinterestsbetweenthetransactingpartiesand. thereby, maydimin-
ish transactions costs of opportunism relative to what is achievable by a
for-profit counterpart.
AnotherpossiblegainintechnicaleffiCiency relatesto improvedinforma-
tionflows incooperatives. Staatz(1984) argues that. becausecooperatives
haveanidentifiablebaseofmember-customersandbecausethesecustom-20 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1993
ersaremorelikelyto truthfullyreveal informationtotheircooperativethan
toaninvestor-ownedfirm (lOF), cooperatives'costofattaininginformation
maybelessthanfor a comparable10Ft Forexample. members mayprovide
information on the types ofproducts and services needed.
An Analysis and Critique ofthe Empirical Evidence
Testing the economic efficiencyofcooperatives. especially relative to the
performanceofcomparablefor-profit firms. is difficult. The majorproblem
inconductingtestsbaseduponequations(1), (2). and(3) or(3') isavailabil-
ityofdata. Dataoninputquantitiesandcostsandonoutput(s)arereqUired
for several cooperatives and, ifthey are to be studied also, investor-owned
firms. Suchdataaregenerallyconfidential. and, moreover. mostindustries
lack a sufficient universe of comparable cooperatives and for-profit firms
to assemble a data set.
In the United States. the industry offering the greatest potential for
analysis based on data availability has been dairy. and it has been the
subjectofmostoftheempiricalefficiencystudiesconductedto date. These
include Babb and Boynton; Porter and Scully; Parliament. Lerman, and
Fulton; and Ferrier and Porter. Studies of agricultural cooperatives' effi-
ciency outside of dairy include Hollas and Stansell on electrical utilities;
Sexton. Wilson. andWann and Caputoand Lynch oncottonginning; ler-
manand Parliamentonfruit andvegetable processing; andSchraderetal.
andAkridgeandHertelongrainmarketingandfarmsupplyprocurement.11
In the dairy industry studies both Porter and Scully, using a statistical
frontier production function approach, and Ferrier and Porter. analyZing
thesamedatawitha programmingapproach. concludedthatcooperatives
are comparatively less efficient than for-profit processors. They inferred
that the cooperatives survive onlythrough governmentsubsidy. Babband
BoyntonandParliament, Lerman. andFultonemployeddifferentanalytical
methods and reached opposite conclusions.
What sense can be made ofthese polar opinions? The Porterand Scully
and Ferrierand Porterstudies arebasedona 1972 crosssectionofeighty-
four dairy cooperatives and eighty-four randomly selected for-profit dairy
processors aggregated by groups ofthree into twenty-eight composite
observationsforeachorganizationalform. Criticismsofthesestudiesbegin
with the data. Labor input was measured as production worker plant
hours, but no plant-level wage data were available, so a national average
wage rate was used. Manufacturing wages. however, differ considerably
across states. Average weekly manufacturing wages in the United States
for 1972 ranged from $112 in North Carolina and Arkansas to $211 in
Michigan. Thus. unless thesamplecooperativeand noncooperative plants
were distributed uniformly across high- and low-wage states. use of this
average wage proxy introduces a bias into the relative efficiency calcula-
tions.
FromPorterandScullytables 1and2. theaveragelabor-capital(LlK) ratio
was higher for the sample cooperative plants than for the noncooperative
plants. Stafford and Roof (table 4) report cooperatives' share of milk mar-
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average 1972 manufacturingwage ineach regionyields a correlation coef-
ficientofr = -0.20. Inotherwords. cooperatives'marketsharewasrelatively
greater in low-wage states in 1972-73. Therefore. cooperatives' relatively
higher UK ratios in these studies are consistent with cost minimizing
behavior. given theirhigherincidenceofoperationinlow-wage states. and
do not support the authors' conclusion ofallocative inefficiency.
Total assetswasusedasa proxyfor capitalinputinbothstudies. Capital
assets arevalued at historical coston financial statements. a numberthat
normally bears little relation to actual capital input due to the effects of
inflation. depreciation. and technical change. Moreover. total assets
includeaccounts suchas cash. inventories. accounts receivable. andland
that bear no relation to investment ofphysical capital. To the extent that
cooperatives for whatever reason have a higher proportion ofthese types
ofassets than noncooperatives. cooperatives' "capital input" as measured
byPorterandSCUlly andFerrierandPorterwill bebiasedupward. creating
anillusionofbothtechnicalandallocative inefficiency. Indeed. Parliament.
Lerman. and Fulton present evidence suggesting this very circumstance.
Cooperativesintheirstudymaintaineda consistentlyhigherliquiditythan
comparable noncooperatives.
The Porter and Scully and Ferrier and Porter data are from firms in SIC
2026. a category that includes bulk flUid milk and cream. packaged flUid
milk. cottagecheese. flavored milkssuchaschocolatemilkandbuttermilk.
and other related products. However. physical outputs are not observed.
Rather. value added is used as a proxy for output and. as such. encom-
passes an array of different products ranging from fluid milk to cottage
cheese. A significant portion of the costs of producing and selling value-
added products is for marketingand promotion. However. these costs are
not measured by either study. As Parliament. Lerman. and Fulton and
Staffordand Roofhave noted. cooperatives operate mostextensivelyin the
low value-added. fluid milk segment of the industry. This fact alone will




use of the scale efficiency concept. Scale inefficiencies are claimed to be
the largestcomponentofcooperatives' inefficiency. causedbythe fact that
cooperative plants intheirsamplewere typicallysmallerthanthefor-profit
plants.
Dairy markets are spatial markets. as these authors acknowledge. The
spatial dimension is caused by geographically scattered production and
relativelycostlytransportation. Optimalplantlocationinspatialindustries
involves balancing fewer plantsandgreatereconomies ofsize versus more
plants and lower transportation costs. The more geographically scattered
and less concentrated production is. the greater the number of relatively
small plants that will be optimal.
13 These small plants will indeed have
higherper-unitprocessingcoststhanlargerplants.buttheymayminimize
the total per-unit cost ofhandling the raw product. which includes both
processingand transportation costs. Hauling costs. however. are notcon-
sidered by Porter and Scully and Ferrier and Porter. and it is. therefore.
incorrect to conclude that the smaller plants are scale inefficient.22 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1993
Afinal criticismofthesestudies is theirfailure toconsiderexplicitlythat
cooperatives often provide more ancillary services to their members such
as field services. market information. insurance programs, and lobbying
than do comparable noncooperatives (Babb and Boynton). These services
do not contribute directly to value added but may be valued by members
and maycontribute to theproductioncostsmeasuredbyPorterandScully
and Ferrier and Porter. To the extent this happens, it will contribute to
an incorrect inference ofcooperative inefficiency.
A reasonable conclusion is that the array of deficiencies in the Porter
andScullyand Ferrierand Porterstudies makethem unreliable as a basis
for formulating policy toward cooperatives. The Babb and Boynton and
Parliament. Lerman. andFultonstudiesbothrelyonsimpler, nonparamet-
ric methods to comparecooperativeand for-profit dairyprocessors'perfor-
mance. Bothstudieswere carefulto avoid the geographicandproductmix
heterogeneitythathamstrungthe PorterandScullyandFerrierandPorter
studies. Babb and Boynton focused exclusively on Wisconsin cheese
plants,14 and Parliament, Lerman, and Fulton compared regional dairy
coops and noncoops ofcomparable size and product mix.
Babb and Boynton found no statistical difference in the price paid for
milk between the two organization types. However, cooperatives were
judgedmoreefficientbecausetheyhada greaterpercentageofplantcapac-
ity utilization and exhibited lower labor and total cost perunit ofproduct
produced. However. even cooperatives' critics agree that expost coopera-
tives may attain a comparable performance to noncooperatives. Arguably,
thisperformancemaybeduetogovernmentsupportprOVidedtothecooper-
atives. In tum, this criticism suggests the importance of analyZing effi-
ciencyintermsoftheformal conceptsdefinedaboveanda formalstatistical
or programming model.
The Parliament, Lerman. and Fulton study relies on the analysis of
financial ratios and the comparison of these ratios between cooperative
and for-profit firms. The study found that cooperative dairy processors
achieved a comparable return on equity. had a generally lower debt-to-
equity ratio, were more liquid. and achieved a higher sales-to-total-asset
ratio relative to a peer group offor-profit processors.
These results are also subject to limitations. Although ratio analysis is
a common tool in finance, the ratios usually lack a solid foundation in
economic theory. Unlike the formal tests ofefficiency conducted by Porter
andScullyandFerrierand Porter. itis difficult to lenda preciseinterpreta-
tion to the various ratios. Second, the ratios may be influenced to an
unknown extent by public support for cooperatives. making the coopera-
tives' ratios more favorable than they would be in the absence of such
support.Third,cooperativesandtheirmembersrepresentajoint,vertically
integratedentity. Evaluatingperformance ofthejointentitybyexamining
data for only a portion of the entity (I.e.. the cooperative subsidiary) will
oftenbemisleading. Thiscriticismappliesparticularlytoattempts tomea-
sure"profitability"andreturnonassetsinthecooperativefacility. Different
outcomes can be attained here by merely shifting income. through choice
of price charged to or paid to members, between stages of the vertically
integratedentity.15Thiscriticismdoesnotapplytoformal testsofefficiency
ofthe cooperative plant based on equations (1), (2), and (3').Economic Efficiency ofCooperatives/Sexton and [skow 23
Despite these limitations, some ofthe Parliament, Lerman, and Fulton
results do present credible evidence to counter the Porter and Scully and
Ferrier and Porter results. The result that cooperatives achieved a higher
sales-to-assets ratio on average is particularly important in this regard.
Among the nondairy applications, both Sexton, Wilson, and Wann and
HollasandStansellappliedAtkinsonandHalvorsen'sstatisticalmodeland
both found some departures from efficiency for the cooperatives in their
samples. Sexton, Wilson, andWannrejected a testofprice efficiencybased
upon equation (3') but were unable to reject allocative efficiency based
uponequation (2) for theirsample ofcooperative cottongins inCalifornia.
They also found no evidence to support a hypothesis that cooperatives
underutilized capital inputs.16 Alimitation ofthis studywas that no data
on for-profit gins were generated to enable relative efficiency to be tested.
HollasandStansell'sapplicationtoelectricalutilitiesinvolvedcomparing
for-profit and municipal utilities with cooperative utilities. The authors
concluded thatall three organizational forms failed tests for allocative and
price efficiency, although for-profit utilities were relatively more efficient
than cooperative or municipal utilities. Hollas andStansell treated capital
as a fixed input and, hence, were unable to test hypotheses concerning
over- or underutilization ofcapital by cooperatives.
Neither Sexton, Wilson, and Wann nor Hollas and Stansell conducted
formal testsfor technicalefficiency. SubsequentworkbyCaputoandLynch
usingFarrell'sprogrammingmethodologyontheSexton,Wilson, andWann
data pinpoints technical inefficiency as a major source of inefficiency for
theginning cooperatives. Again, no comparisons with for-profit gins were
possible with this data set.
Akridge and Hertel employed a generalized translog multiproduct cost
function to test for cost differences between cooperative and investor-
owned farm supply firms. Formal tests based on equations (1)-(3') were
not conducted. Rather, a {O,I} dummy variable was used to distinguish
coop from noncoop observations in the cost and input share equations.
Estimation results showed a small, statistically insignificant efficiency
advantage to the cooperative firms. These resultstended to affirm conclu-
sions reached from previous analysis ofthe same data by Schrader et al.
Lerman and Parliament used financial ratio analysis to compare the
performance of U.S. cooperative and investor-owned fruit and vegetable
processors for 1976-87. The two organizational forms were found to per-
form similarly in the areas ofreturn on equityand debt relative to equity,
but the cooperatives exhibited lower sales to fixed assets and inventory
turnoverratios. Thecooperativeswere also relativelylessliquid. Thisstudy
employed the same methodology and, hence, shares the same strengths





global role ofthis type ofcooperative organizationmayexpand. Therefore,24 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1993
research that evaluates the comparative strengths and weaknesses ofthe
cooperative form of organization is important. This paper has surveyed
and critiqued the research on one key facet ofthis evaluation: the relative
economic efficiency of cooperative organizations. Based on the efficiency
studiesconductedto date. we concludethatthere islittlecredibleevidence
to support the common perception of farmers and cooperative experts
(Schrader et al. and Cain. Toensmeyer. and Ramsey) that investor-owned
firms are moreefficientthancomparablecooperatives. Evidence tosupport
a contrary perception is. however. also limited.
More research in this area is clearly needed. The ideal study should
combine the careful sample selection procedures ofSchrader et al.; Babb
and Boynton; and Parliament. Lerman. and Fulton with the rigorous effi-
ciency measures used by Porter and Scully and Ferrierand Porter. Imple-
mentingthistype ofstudymayrequireaccessingdatathatareconfidential
or working with undesirable proxy variables. Because of these difficulties
we arenotsangUinethat therewill soonbedefinitive resultsonthe impor-
tant issue of relative cooperative efficiency. In the interim. however. it is
important to recognize the limitations ofthe work done to date.
Notes
1. Efficiencyissuesarealsoa concerninworkerorproductioncooperatives(also
often called labor-managed firms). In manyrespects, however, these organizations
present unique issues that do not facilitate a parallel treatment with agricultural
marketing and supply cooperatives.
2. Surveys ofcooperative theorybySexton and also Staatz (1987) discuss this
issue.
3. An issuearisesas towhethermarginalcostinequation(3) shouldbedefined
asa firm's actualmarginalcost. inwhichcaseitmayembodyallocative inefficiency,
orwhetherMC should be defined as efficient marginal cost based on equation (2).
See Kumbhakar, Biswas, and Bailey for a further discussion on this point.
4. Horizontal summation of individual members' marginal cost curves is the
correctway to derive the aggregate marginal costofrawproduct to the cooperative
for the plausible casewhenprices for inputs intheproductionofXl are exogenous
to the members both as individuals and as a group.
5. These two concepts ofscale efficiencycanbe reconciled through the notions
of private versus social optimality. When a competitive firm satisfies the scale
efficiency condition in equation (3), it is choosing the privately optimal level of
output. When it chooses a level ofoutput consistentwith achievingunitcostAC·,
itischoosinga sociallyoptimaloutputlevel inthesenseofminimizingtheresource
cost associated with producing Q.
6. Ferrier and Porter and Caputo and Lynch suggest nonparametric tests of
the efficiency estimates derived from the programming approach.
7. Forexample. AtkinsonandHalvorsenshowthat regulated electrical utilities
are biased toward overuse ofcapital due to Averch-Johnson effects.
8. Severalmethodscanbeemployedtosomewhatmitigatethehorizonproblem
incooperatives. RevolVing fund planswith a shortrevolvement cycleorbasecapital
plans with a short base period help to align ownership with benefits. Similarly.
anymechanismthatfacilitates transferofmembershiprights(forexample. toheirs
orbuyers ofthe farm enterprise) mayhelp members to capture the future income-
earning potential of their investments in the cooperative. In practice. however.
revolvementperiodsareoftentenormoreyearsandmembership-transferrightsareEconomic Efficiency of Cooperatives/Sexton and [show 25
severelyrestricted. makingthehorizonproblema majorissuefor mostagricultural
cooperatives.
9. SeeMurrayandalsoStaatz(1984). Becauseequitycapitalisnottheresidual
claimantina cooperative. usuallyreceiveslittleornodividend. andishighlyllliquid.
members may be unwilling to supply equity capital to the cooperative. preferring
instead to free ride on others' contributions.
10. For example. eligib1l1ty for protection under the Capper-Volstead Act and
for certain income tax deductions requires U.S. cooperatives to I1mit nonmember
business to no more than 50 percent oftotal business.
11. Thetenstudiescitedinthisparagraphlllustratethedataavailab1l1typroblem
in that they are based on only five independent data sets. Babb and Boynton.
Schrader et al.. and Akridge and Hertel all use data from a comprehensive study
initiated in 1979. Parliament. Lerman. and Fulton and Lerman and Parliament
are based on financial statement data generated from a survey of leading U.S.
cooperatives. Porter and Scully and Ferrier and Porter rely on the same data set
as do Sexton. Wilson. and Wann and Caputo and Lynch.
12. It is commonly agreed that the value-added segments of the dairy industry
are itslesscompetitivesegments. Therefore. a portionofthe"valueadded" inthese
segments mayrepresent monopoly overcharges. Evidence on this pointfor cottage
cheese is available from Haller. The average price for all brands of cottage cheese
(coop and noncoop) in 1988 was $1.15 per pound. The average price for coop
brands was $1.03 per pound. Several factors including monopoly power could
contribute to explainingthis price difference (the sample. however. was chosen to
hold quality roughly constant). The key point for our purposes is that the lower
coop prices contribute erroneously to their measured technical inefficiency under
Porter and Scully's and Ferrier and Porter's value-added measure of output.
13. These isolated plants are more likely to be operated as cooperatives. ceteris
paribus. because monopsony problems from patronizing a for-profit plant would
be extreme in these settings.
14. The Babb and Boyntonstudyisa componentofthe comprehensive analysis
of comparative cooperative efficiency in several industries including dairy. grain
and soybeans. fruit and vegetable processing. farm supply sales. and farm credit.
The complete study is reported in Schrader et al.
15. This criticism is less important in industries where competitive pressures
(forexample. fromcreditors)causecooperativestobehavesimilarlytotheirinvestor-
owned competitors.
16. Rather. the evidence suggested absolute overutilization of capital. a result
consistent with a hypothesis posed by Caves and Peterson. Akridge and Hertel's
analysisoffarmsupplyfirmsalsorevealedsomeevidenceofoverutilizationofcapital
by cooperatives relative to investor-owned counterparts.
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